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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the effects of education saving incentives on the level of private saving by
households. Little is known about this subject. One explanation for this gap in the literature is that
because education saving incentives are relatively new, data on education saving are not readily
available. Using wealth data from a survey of TIAA-CREF participants, this paper attempts to
estimate whether saving in education saving programs offsets other household saving. As in the
extant literature of the impact of retirement saving programs on household saving, an empirical
challenge is how to deal with the issue of saver heterogeneity. In this paper, two strategies are used
to address this issue. The first strategy distinguishes savers from non-savers by whether households
have an IRA or a supplemental pension plan. The second strategy uses the propensity score approach
to control for unobserved heterogeneity in taste for saving. Results from both strategies suggest that
education saving incentives in general do not offset other household saving and stimulate saving for
households with high propensities to use education savings accounts.
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TIAA-CREF Institute 
730 Third Avenue, 24th Floor 
New York, NY 10017 
jma@tiaa-cref.org1 Introduction 
College tuition inflation in the past thirty years has averaged two to three percentage 
points higher than the general price inflation and is showing no sign of slowing down.  For the 
2001-2002 academic year, the average in-state tuition and fees at four-year public colleges and 
universities was $3,754, a 7.7 percent increase from the previous year.  For the same academic 
year, the average tuition and fees at four-year private colleges and universities was $17,123, a 
5.5 percent increase from the previous year.
1 
As the cost of college continues to rise at a fast pace, financing a college education has 
become a growing concern for many families.  In order to help families save for college, the 
federal government has introduced two tax-favored education saving instruments in recent 
years: the 529 plan and the Education IRA (recently renamed the Coverdell Education Savings 
Account).  These saving instruments are just “Roth IRAs for education expenses.”  
Contributions to these education saving instruments are not deductible for federal tax purposes, 
but earnings on qualified withdrawals are exempt from federal income tax.
2  These education 
saving instruments, the 529 plans in particular, have grown rapidly since their inception and 
will likely grow even more quickly under the new tax law passed in 2001. 
Education saving instruments are only one of the government’s interventions in the 
capital market for higher education investments.  However, they are an important one.  The 
new education saving instruments represent an important redirection of state and federal efforts 
toward saving and away from two major forms of public subsidy to higher education — state-
                                                 
1 Source: Trends in College Pricing 2001, the College Board. 
2 Note that the tax law that provides federal tax exemption on earnings of qualified 529 plan withdrawals 
  1subsidized public tuition prices and needs-based federal financial aid such as grants and student 
loans.  For example, while state and local appropriations accounted for 48 percent of the total 
current-fund revenue for public degree-granting institutions in the 1980-81 academic year, they 
accounted for only 36 percent in the 1996-97 academic year.
3 
Enthusiasm for the tax-favored education saving instruments was partly spurred by the 
idea that they would raise households’ saving rate by targeting a segment of the population that 
is not targeted already by IRAs and 401(k)s.  Moreover, by offering tax incentives, education 
saving instruments may encourage marginal families to save and plan for college, which may 
have a positive influence on students’ college experience.
4 
As in the case of other tax-favored saving programs, whether saving in education saving 
instruments represents new saving is an empirical issue.  In the last two decades, a large and 
contentious literature has developed over the impact of IRAs and 401(k)s on private and 
national saving.  Some researchers (Poterba, Venti, and Wise) have found evidence that 
suggests the majority of saving in tax-favored retirement accounts represents new saving while 
other researchers (Gale and Scholtz) have found evidence that suggests just the opposite. 
While the debate on the impact of retirement saving programs has continued for years, 
little is known about how education saving programs affect household saving.  One explanation 
for this gap in the literature is that because education saving programs are relatively new, data 
                                                                                                                                                           
is scheduled to expire on December 31, 2010. Congress may or may not extend the law beyond this date. 
3 Source: Digest of Education Statistics 2001, Department of Education. 
4 Despite the fact that loans are available and can be made the responsibility of the student himself, 
anecdotal evidence suggests that many families with a record of successful college attendance make considerable 
use of internal family financing (i.e. parental savings).   Although the greater college success of savers may be due 
to their greater incomes or superior planning, it is also possible that saving and debt do not have parallel effects on 
students’ college experience.  Perhaps piling up debt worries students and causes them to disengage from college 
in order to earn money.  It is also possible that act of saving for college causes a family to think more concretely 
about college and prepare for it better. 
  2on education saving are not readily available.  Using wealth data from a survey of TIAA-CREF 
participants, this paper attempts a first check on whether education saving incentives offset 
other household saving, controlling for saver heterogeneity.  Results suggest that in general 
education saving instruments do not seem to offset other forms of household saving.  For 
households with high likelihood of using education savings accounts, education saving seems 
to be positively correlated with other household assets. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 describes the 529 plan 
and the recently renamed Coverdell Education Savings Account.  Section 3 describes the data 
and presents some summary statistics.  Section 4 provides a brief summary of the IRA and 
401(k) literature and discusses the empirical strategies used in this paper to identify savers from 
non-savers.  Section 5 presents the regression results.  Section 6 provides some concluding 
remarks. 
2  The 529 Plan and the Coverdell Education Savings Account 
2.1  The 529 Plan 
Named after the section of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) that created them, 529 
plans are qualified tuition programs designed to help families save for college expenses.  Two 
types of 529 plans are available: savings and prepaid.  Savings plans are investment programs 
that typically offer a variable rate of return.  Prepaid plans usually allow the plan purchaser to 
prepay future tuition credits at current prices.  All of the existing 529 savings and prepaid plans 
are sponsored by individual states.  However, some private colleges and universities may 
establish their own prepaid plans in the near future. 
Although the first prepaid plan (Michigan Education Trust) was introduced in 1988, it 
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state-sponsored plans.  Under Section 529, earnings in state-sponsored plans grow federal and 
state tax-free until withdrawal.  Contributions to 529 plans are not deductible for federal 
income tax purposes.  However, they are deductible (usually subject to an annual maximum) in 
some states for state income tax purposes. 
Before 2002, when withdrawals from a 529 plan were made to pay for qualified higher 
education expenses, the earnings portion was subject to federal income tax at the beneficiary’s 
rate.  The state tax treatment on earnings of qualified withdrawals depended on the state.  While 
some states followed the federal tax treatment, many exempted earnings of qualified 
withdrawals from state tax to provide additional tax benefits. 
The Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001 (the 2001 Tax Act) provided 
more favorable tax treatment for 529 plans, as the earnings of qualified withdrawals from state-
sponsored plans were made exempt from federal income tax, starting in 2002.  States that 
currently do not exempt earnings from state income taxes may follow suit and exempt earnings 
from state taxes.  Starting in 2004, prepaid plans established by private colleges and 
universities will also be eligible for the same benefits as state-sponsored plans.
5   
The 529 plan is also more flexible than most tax-favored saving vehicles.  There is no 
income restriction on participation or tax benefits.  Anyone, regardless of income, can 
contribute to a 529 plan.  Withdrawals may be used to pay for tuition, fees, room and board, 
books, supplies, and equipment required for enrollment or attendance at an eligible 
undergraduate, graduate, or professional institution of higher education, or any approved 
                                                 
5 Note that the provisions of the 2001 Tax Act regarding Section 529 of the IRC are scheduled to expire 
on December 31, 2010.  Congress may or may not extend the tax benefits beyond this date.  If the law is not 
  4vocational/technical school.  Eligible postsecondary institutions include those that are 
accredited and are eligible to participate in student aid programs administered by the 
Department of Education. 
While most state-sponsored prepaid plans are open to state residents only, most savings 
plans allow anyone from any state to open an account.  There is generally no annual 
contribution limit for 529 plans.  Most plans impose a lifetime limit per beneficiary on account 
balances (the sum of contributions and earnings less fees and expenses); a few plans impose a 
lifetime limit on gross contributions.  Lifetime limits vary widely across states and are usually 
adjusted once a year to reflect inflation.  Table A1 shows as of September 2002, the lowest 
lifetime limit on account balances was $122,484 (California) and the highest was $305,000 
(South Dakota).
6  Table A1 also shows that minimum contribution requirements are generally 
low. 
Awareness of and interest in 529 plans have increased considerably after the 2001 Tax 
Act made the earnings of qualified withdrawals exempt from federal income tax.  As of March 
2002, there were approximately 3.1 million accounts with a total asset value of $18.9 billion 
across all 529 savings and prepaid plans, an increase of 75 percent compared to June 2001.  As 
of September 2002, forty-eight states had 529 savings plans in operation.  The rest of the states 
and District of Columbia had 529 savings plans under development.  Twenty-two states had 
529 prepaid plans either in operation or under development.
7  
With increased interest in 529 plans, more and more employers are offering 529 plan 
                                                                                                                                                           
extended the federal tax treatment of 529 plans will revert to its status prior to January 1, 2002. 
6 See Ma, Warshawsky, Ameriks, and Blohm (2001) for a study of using an economic approach to set the 
contribution limits for 529 plans.  In practice, limits are set by states according to broad considerations set forth in 
the IRC and regulations.  In states with lifetime limits on account balances, once the combined balance for a 
designated beneficiary reaches the maximum limit, the program will stop taking new contributions. 
  5automatic payroll deductions for their employees.  To take things one step further, it would be 
interesting for employers to make 529 plan enrollment a default for some employees (for 
example, those with young children). 
The earnings of non-qualified withdrawals from 529 plans are subject to federal and 
state income taxes at the distributee’s rate in addition to a ten-percent penalty tax.  However, 
the account owner may make a penalty-free, tax-free rollover by designating another “member 
of the family” as the new beneficiary.  The ten-percent penalty does not apply in the event there 
is a withdrawal due to the beneficiary’s death or disability.  If the beneficiary receives a tax-
free scholarship, educational assistance allowance, or other tax-free educational benefits, then 
the distribution from a 529 plan is not subject to the ten-percent penalty to the extent that the 
distribution is not more than the amount of the scholarship, educational allowance, or other 
similar benefits. 
2.2  The Coverdell Education Savings Account 
The recently renamed Coverdell Education Savings Account was introduced as part of 
the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997.  Contributions to the Coverdell are not tax-deductible.  
However, earnings are exempt from federal and state income taxes if withdrawals are used to 
pay for qualified education expenses.  Before 2002, qualified expenses included higher 
education expenses only.  The 2001 Tax Act provided that starting in 2002, qualified expenses 
would also include elementary and secondary school expenses at public, private, or religious 
schools.
8 
                                                                                                                                                           
7 Source: College Savings Plan Network. 
8 Allowable higher education expenses are the same as those for 529 plans.  Allowable elementary and 
secondary school expenses include tuition, fees, academic tutoring, books, supplies, other equipment, "special 
needs services", room and board, uniforms, transportation and "supplementary items and services".   
  6There is an income restriction on participation in the Coverdell.  For 2001, the phase-
out range was between $95,000 and $110,000 for single tax filers and between $150,000 and 
$160,000 for joint tax filers.  In 2002, more families are eligible for the Coverdell, as the 2001 
Tax Act raised the income phase-out range for married couples to between $190,000 and 
$220,000.  The 2001 Tax Act also raised the annual contribution limit for the Coverdell from 
$500 to $2,000 per beneficiary, starting in 2002. 
The earnings on non-qualified withdrawals from Coverdells are subject to federal and 
state income taxes at the distributee’s rate in addition to a ten-percent penalty (with similar 
exceptions as those for 529 plans).  Before the tax law changes in 2001, an excise tax was 
imposed if individuals contributed to both a 529 plan and a Coverdell on behalf of the same 
beneficiary in the same year. The new law provided that starting in 2002, the excise tax would 
no longer apply.  However, the federal law prohibits the use of same education expenses to 
support tax-free distributions from both a 529 plan and a Coverdell. Furthermore, the education 
expenses used to support tax-free distributions from a 529 plan or a Coverdell may not be used 
to claim a Hope or Lifetime Learning Credit. 
Table 1 summarizes some key features of the 529 plan and Coverdell.  Since the 529 
plan and Coverdell have very similar tax treatment on earnings and contributions, a comparison 
of the attractiveness of the two education saving instruments reduces to a comparison of fees 
(Ma and Fore, 2001).  Currently, the fees charged by 529 plans range widely from a low of 0.3 
percent to a high of over 2 percent.  Assuming the same rates of return for a 529 plan and 
Coverdell, the plan with lower fees will result in a higher level of asset accumulation.  Another 
difference between the two saving instruments is that 529 plan investors may not make direct 
investment decisions, while Coverdell investors may.  Finally, when it comes to calculating a 
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account will be considered as the student’s assets and assessed at a 35 percent rate, while assets 
in a 529 account will be considered as the parents’ assets (if the owner is a parent) and assessed 
at a 5.6 percent rate.  Since a higher EFC means a lower level of financial needs, assets in a 
Coverdell account will reduce a student’s financial aid more than assets in a 529 plan will.   
Table 2 illustrates how families may use the 529 plan and Coverdell to save for future 
college expenses.  Column 1 of Table 2 indicates a monthly contribution of $22 over an 18-
year investment horizon would be sufficient to fund the average cost of a two-year education at 
a public two-year college.  Columns 2 and 3 indicate that monthly contributions of $240 and 
$630 over an 18-year investment horizon would be sufficient to fund the average cost of a four-
year education at a public four-year and private four-year college, respectively. 
It is also worth noting that the Registered Education Savings Plans (RESPs) in Canada 
are similar to the 529 plan and Coverdell. Contributions to the RESPs are not tax-deductible.  
However, earnings grow tax-free until withdrawal.  When withdrawals are used to pay for 
qualified higher education expenses, earnings are taxed as the beneficiary’s income.  Earnings 
on non-qualified withdrawals (withdrawals not used for higher education) are taxable as the 
account subscriber (owner)’s income.  For each beneficiary, the current annual contribution 
limit is CAD 4,000 and the lifetime limit is CAD 42,000.  
3  The 2000 TIAA-CREF Survey of Participant Finances 
 To examine the impact of education saving instruments on other household saving, 
information on contributions or accumulations in education saving, other saving, and 
demographics is required.  Currently, there is no publicly available wealth data that contain 
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of Consumer Finances (SCF) conducted by the Federal Reserve Board includes questions on 
education saving programs such as the 529 plans and Coverdells.  However, the 2001 SCF data 
will not be available until 2003. 
The data used in this study are drawn from the 2000 TIAA-CREF Survey of Participant 
Finances (SPF) conducted by TIAA-CREF.  TIAA-CREF is a non-profit organization that 
provides retirement plans at more than 12,000 colleges, universities, research centers, medical 
organizations and other nonprofit institutions throughout the United States.  The 2000 TIAA-
CREF SPF sample consists mostly of employees of colleges and universities.  A small portion 
of the sample consists of employees of research and other nonprofit organizations. 
The 2000 TIAA-CREF SPF was conducted among members of the TIAA-CREF 
“Research Panel.”  The TIAA-CREF Research Panel was established in 1993 when 60,000 
TIAA-CREF participants were randomly selected to participate in the TIAA-CREF Research 
Panel Project.  The purpose of the Research Panel Project was to select a sample of TIAA-
CREF participants for future studies of participant financial decisions.  A brief questionnaire 
was mailed to these 60,000 randomly selected participants asking information about themselves 
and their families.  Of these 60,000 individuals selected, 9,847 responded to the 1993 Research 
Panel questionnaire and formed the initial TIAA-CREF Research Panel.  In the subsequent 
years, some members were dropped from the Research Panel due to death, change of 
participant status, or change of address.  Several sample replenishment efforts were made in 
1995, 1997, and 1999. 
The 2000 TIAA-CREF SPF is a comprehensive survey of household finances.  It was 
designed to examine in detail the types and amounts of financial assets owned by TIAA-CREF 
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financial decisions.  Survey packets containing a cover letter and an eight-page questionnaire 
were mailed in January 2000 to a total of 9,234 Research Panel members.  A total of 2,835 
completed questionnaires (2,793 usable) were received representing an overall response rate of 
31 percent. 
The 2000 TIAA-CREF SPF gathered a wide range of information on household 
finances and demographics.  The demographic information gathered includes respondent’s age, 
gender, education, employment status, occupation, marital status, and the number of children 
for whom the respondent’s household is financially responsible.  The financial information 
gathered includes the amount and sources of the respondent’s income, the types of retirement 
investments, non-retirement financial accounts, real estate holdings in the household, and the 
estimates of the current value for each of those investments.  Information on household 
mortgages and other types of financial commitments was also gathered.  For married 
respondents, information on the spouse’s employment status, income, and retirement assets was 
also collected.  Most importantly, respondents were asked whether anyone in his/her household 
had a Coverdell, a 529 savings account, or a 529 prepaid contract.  Respondents were asked to 
provide a value if they answered yes to any of these questions.  Respondents were also asked to 
measure on a 1-10 scale how important it was for them to leave a bequest. 
3.1  A Comparison of the 2000 TIAA-CREF SPF with the 1998 SCF 
Table 3 shows the summary statistics of households from the 1998 SCF and households 
from the 2000 TIAA-CREF SPF.  Clearly, households from the two surveys are quite different 
in terms of both demographic and financial characteristics.  As Table 3 shows, the respondents 
in the 2000 TIAA-CREF SPF are older and much more educated than the respondents in the 
  101998 SCF.  For example, while only 33.2 percent of the 1998 SCF respondents have a college 
degree, 87.5 percent of the 2000 TIAA-CREF SPF respondents have at least a college degree 
and 33.4 percent have a Ph.D. degree. 
Table 3 also shows that households from the 2000 TIAA-CREF SPF on average earned 
much higher income than those from the 1998 SCF.  The median 1999 household income from 
the 2000 TIAA-CREF SPF was more than twice as much as the median 1997 household 
income from the 1998 SCF.  Even when the median household income from the 1998 SCF is 
inflated by 10 percent to the 1999 level, it is still less than half of that from the 2000 TIAA-
CREF SPF.  (The March Current Population Survey data suggest that for households with 
householders 25 years and older, the median income in current dollars rose by 10.1 percent 
between 1997 and 1999 while the mean income in current dollars rose by 10.6 percent.)  
Moreover, households from the 2000 TIAA-CREF SPF are much wealthier than those from the 
1998 SCF.  The median net worth for households from the 1998 SCF is only $71,700, 
compared to $467,728 for those from the 2000 TIAA-CREF SPF. 
The above comparisons suggest that the sample in the 2000 TIAA-CREF SPF is quite 
different from the general population.  The respondents in the 2000 TIAA-CREF SPF are older, 
much more educated and wealthier than the general population.  These unique characteristics 
make the 2000 TIAA-CREF SPF particularly well suited to the task of assessing the 
effectiveness of education saving programs mainly for two reasons.  First, the TIAA-CREF 
sample is more likely to be saving-prone and more likely to plan for college.  Thus, they are 
more likely to use the new education saving instruments than the typical American household, 
especially when the instruments are new and unfamiliar to most people.  In fact, as of 
December 1999, while 2.4 percent of the TIAA-CREF SPF households reported owning a 529 
  11savings or prepaid plan, less than 1.2 percent of the U.S. households owned a 529 plan.
9  This 
confirms the TIAA-CREF sample is much more likely to use education saving instruments than 
the general population.  The proneness of the TIAA-CREF sample to use saving instruments 
allows one to find a sufficient number of users in a small sample. 
Second, estimates from the TIAA-CREF sample will likely overstate the extent to 
which education saving crowds out other saving.  Research on retirement saving suggests that 
reshuffling of assets is more likely to occur for high-income households (Gale and Scholtz, 
2000).  Moreover, not only is the TIAA-CREF sample wealthier and has accumulated higher 
levels of saving (and more saving to crowd out), it also consists largely of education-sector 
workers who are very consciously dedicated to ensuring their children’s college opportunities.  
These individuals are far more likely to have been saving explicitly for college even in the 
absence of tax-favored instruments, which also raises the likelihood of crowding out.  
Therefore, one can confidently predict that there would be much less crowding out in the 
overall population than in the TIAA-CREF sample.  
3.2  Non-responses in the Survey and Sample Selection 
Although missing data are common for many wealth surveys, the item response rates in 
the 2000 TIAA-CREF SPF are quite high.  Table 4 presents the proportions of non-responses to 
financial asset questions in the 2000 TIAA-CREF SPF survey.  As Table 4 shows, the item 
                                                 
9 These comparisons are on 529 plans only because data on the aggregate number of Coverdell accounts 
are not readily available.   
  Source: Author’s calculations.  The percentage of U.S. households owning a 529 plan was calculated by 
dividing the total number of 529 accounts in the U.S. by the total number of households, as of December 1999.  
Data on the total number of 529 accounts are from the College Savings Plans Network and data on the total 
number of households are from the U.S. Census Bureau.  It is worth noting that to the extent that some households 
may have multiple 529 accounts, the actual percentage of households owning 529 plans may be slightly lower than 
the calculated 1.2 percent.  
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financial assets (Column 4). 
Missing data could arise as a result of non-response to ownership questions or value 
questions, or sometimes, both.  Column 1 in Table 4 indicates that between 2.0 and 16.3 
percent of respondents did not provide an answer to the ownership question for various types of 
financial assets.  Column 3 suggests that among those who answered yes to the ownership 
questions, between 6.2 and 20.6 percent did not provide a value.  As a result, between 5.9 and 
23.2 percent of respondents had missing data for various assets (Column 4).   
Of all of the assets listed in Table 4, TIAA-CREF retirement assets (Row 1) seem to 
have a much higher non-response rate (23.2 percent) than other assets.  One reason for this is 
that a third of the sample consists of annuitant respondents who were already receiving life-
annuity income from TIAA-CREF.  For these respondents, it is difficult for them to report the 
value of their TIAA-CREF retirement assets.  In other words, since they had already annuitized 
part or all of their TIAA-CREF retirement assets, they would need to calculate the present 
value of their future annuity income in order to figure out the total value of their TIAA-CREF 
retirement assets.  Fortunately, for annuitants, the value of their total TIAA-CREF retirement 
assets can be calculated by adding together their non-annuitized assets and their annuity 
reserves from the TIAA-CREF accounting data.  The annuity reserve for an annuitant is the 
amount of reserve set aside to fund the annuitant’s life-annuity income.  The value of an 
annuitant’s annuity reserve can be considered as the present value of the annuitant’s life-
annuity income, using the TIAA-CREF guaranteed interest rate as the discount rate. 
Non-responses become more of an issue when one calculates aggregate wealth levels, 
even though the non-response rates for individual assets are rather low.  For example, when one 
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missing data due to non-responses to the ownership and/or value questions for at least one of 
the assets.  In order to reduce the number of observations with missing net worth, the 
respondent’s self-reported data on TIAA-CREF retirement assets were replaced with TIAA-
CREF accounting data.  As a result, the proportion of respondents with missing data for net 
worth reduced to 51.1 percent.  It is worth noting that the net worth calculated from TIAA-
CREF accounting data is highly correlated with that from self-reported data with a correlation 
coefficient of 0.96. 
Also of special attention are the non-responses for the three education saving questions.  
At first glance, the non-response rates for the three education saving questions seem much 
higher than those for other financial assets.  Further investigation of the data reveals that 
majorities of the non-responses to education saving questions represent non-responses to all 
three education saving questions (440 cases).  Of these 440 cases, household’s non-education 
net worth (the sum of net non-education financial assets and real estate equity) is available for 
184 cases.  This indicates that these 184 respondents filled out all the necessary information 
needed for the calculation of household non-education net worth, but left the education saving 
questions blank.  Because these education saving instruments were rather new at the time of the 
survey (approximately two years after their introduction), it is likely that many respondents 
were not familiar with these incentives and did not understand the questions.  However, those 
respondents who did report having such education saving seemed to understand the questions 
and most of them provided a valid and positive answer for the value question.  Therefore, it 
seems reasonable to assume that these 184 respondents did not have such accounts.  Under such 
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ten percent. 
Of the 2,793 respondents, 171 reported having at least one of the three education saving 
instruments.  The number of respondents reported having a Coverdell, a 529 savings account, 
and a 529 prepaid contract was 109, 57, and 13, respectively.  Moreover, 96, 53, and 11 
provided a non-zero account balance.  The reported median balance for the three types of 
accounts was $2,000, $10,000, and $5,000, respectively.  Due to the small number of 
respondents who reported having these education saving accounts, it is difficult to empirically 
distinguish the impact of each of these education incentives on household wealth.  Therefore, 
all three education saving instruments are treated equally in the empirical analysis.  In other 
words, the balances of all education saving accounts are aggregated to create a variable that 
measures a household’s total education saving. 
Observations with missing values for explanatory variables in the regressions are 
excluded from the analysis.  Also excluded from the regression analysis are observations with 
extreme values of net worth (over $10 million, 1 case) and observations with missing values for 
net worth.  The final regression sample includes 1265 cases. 
4  Empirical Strategy — How to Control for Saver Heterogeneity?  
As mentioned earlier, one important public policy question for tax-favored saving 
programs is whether saving in these tax-favored programs represents new saving.  In other 
words, does saving in education saving programs offset other household saving?  The answer to 
this question in large part depends on the source of contributions to these programs.  If the 
source of contributions is reduced consumption or tax saving, then saving in these programs 
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the portion of wealth that would have been saved anyway even in the absence of these tax-
favored saving programs, then tax-favored saving programs do not stimulate new saving. 
In empirically estimating the saving effects of tax-favored retirement or education 
saving programs, a challenging issue is how to deal with saver heterogeneity.  Individuals’ 
saving behaviors may be different due to unobservable individual-specific preferences such as 
their propensity to save.  For example, participants in tax-favored saving programs may have 
stronger tastes for saving than others and may tend to save more in all forms.  Econometric 
models that do not control for saver heterogeneity are likely to overestimate the saving effects 
of tax incentives. 
In the retirement saving literature, a substantial amount of research has been devoted to 
estimate the impact of IRAs and 401(k) plans on households’ wealth.  This section provides a 
summary of selected studies in the retirement saving literature.   
4.1  A Summary of Selected Studies in the Retirement Saving Literature 
Two major retirement saving incentives, the IRA and the 401(k) have been the subject 
of substantial public discussion and economic analysis.  When first introduced in 1974, IRAs 
were only available to individuals not covered by an employer pension plan.  There was no 
income restriction.  Contributions were tax deductible and capped at $1,500 per year.  The 
entire proceeds were subject to income taxes upon withdrawals.  There was a 10 percent 
penalty on withdrawals made before the owner turned 59½. 
The IRAs grew rapidly after the Economic Recovery Act of 1981 raised the annual 
contribution limit to $2,000 and made all wage earners and their spouses eligible.  However, 
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced the tax benefits so that contributions were no longer 
  16deductible for higher-income individuals covered by a pension plan.  Consequently, 
contributions to IRAs dropped sharply. 
The 401(k) plan became popular in the 1980s and is one of the most important 
retirement saving programs.  Sponsored by employers, only employees of firms that offer such 
plans are eligible to participate in a 401(k) plan.  The 401(k) plan offers tax deduction on 
contributions, tax-free growth on earnings, and very often, employer matching contributions.  
The entire proceeds are subject to income taxes upon withdrawal.  There is a 10 percent penalty 
on withdrawals made before the owner turned 59½.  Before 1987, participants were allowed to 
contribute up to $30,000 per year.  The Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced the annual contribution 
limit to $7,000.  The limit is adjusted annually to reflect inflation.  The contribution limit for 
the 2002 tax year is $11,000. 
Since the introduction of the IRA and 401(k), there has been a growing literature on the 
saving effects of these tax-favored retirement programs.  The focus has been whether and to 
what extent IRA and 401(k) saving represents new saving.  A central theme of this body of 
research is how to deal with saver heterogeneity.  In dealing with saver heterogeneity, various 
methods have been used to identify savers from non-savers, some of them described below.  
For more detailed reviews of this literature, see Bernheim (1999), Poterba, Venti, and Wise 
(1996), and Engen and Gale (2000). 
Comparing the Same Individuals or Similar Individuals Using Multiple Waves of Data 
When panel data are available, one method to control for saver heterogeneity is to 
follow the same households and compare the retirement and non-retirement assets of the same 
households over time. This method relies on the assumption that any unobserved individual-
specific preferences in tastes for saving can be “differenced out” when one calculates the 
  17change in wealth levels of the same individuals over a certain time period.  Studies that have 
used this identification strategy include Venti and Wise (1992, 1995), and Gale and Scholz 
(1994).  Venti and Wise (1995) estimate whether IRA contributions reduce other non-IRA 
financial assets, using two waves of the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) 
data.  They find that whether households contributed to IRAs had little impact on their non-IRA 
financial assets. 
Another strategy to identify savers is to compare households with similar 
characteristics, using multiple waves of cross-section data.  Using data from the 1984, 1987 and 
1991 waves of the SIPP, Poterba, Venti and Wise (1995) estimate the saving effects of 
retirement programs.  They group households by whether households participated in IRA or 
401(k) saving programs.  They find that after controlling for age, income, education, and 
marital status, a family’s IRA or 401(k) ownership or contribution status does not affect other 
non-IRA non-401(k) financial assets.  Therefore, they conclude that contributions to IRAs or 
401(k)s do not reduce other saving.  
Engen and Gale (1995) use the 1987 and 1991 waves of the SIPP data and compare the 
wealth accumulations of the same comparison groups as Poterba, Venti and Wise (1995).  They 
find that controlling for some demographics and income, 401(k)-eligible households 
accumulated more financial assets than other households.  However, when they use a broad 
measure of wealth that includes net financial assets and home equity, 401(k)-eligible 
households did not accumulate more wealth than other households.  They find similar results 
when comparing the wealth accumulations of IRA owners and non-owners.  They argue that 
between 1987 and 1991, the housing value of 401(k)-eligible households rose compared to non-
eligible households, but the mortgage debt level of those households rose even more.  As a 
  18result, the home equity of 401(k)-eligible households fell during that period.  Their results 
suggest that 401(k)-eligible households substitute 401(k) assets for home equity. 
The Eligibility Experiment 
Another identification strategy, employed by Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995) and 
Engelhardt (2000), relies on the assumption that the determination of 401(k) eligibility status is 
exogenous and uncorrelated with the observed or unobserved household characteristics.  
Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995) estimate whether 401(k) contributions offset other 
conventional personal financial asset saving and IRA saving, assuming the 401(k) eligibility 
status is independent of households’ preferences for saving, given income.  Using data from the 
1984, 1987, and 1991 waves of SIPP, they find little substitution between 401(k) saving and 
other conventional personal financial asset saving.  They also find very little substitution 
between 401(k) saving and IRA saving.  They conclude that most 401(k) contributions 
represent net new saving.  
Using the 1992 Health and Retirement Study, Engelhardt (2000) finds results that are 
similar to those in Poterba, Venti, and Wise (1995), when non-401(k) pension wealth is not 
taken into account.  However, when non-401(k) pension wealth is included in the wealth 
measure, he finds that the total wealth levels of eligible and non-eligible families are similar.  
Thus, his results suggest that families tend to substitute 401(k) pension wealth for non-401(k) 
pension wealth. 
In an effort to reconcile the discrepancies in findings of different studies, Engen and 
Gale (2000) estimate the effects of 401(k) plans on household wealth.  Their new econometric 
specification allows the impact of 401(k) to vary over both time and earnings groups.  Using 
data from the 1987 and 1991 waves of the SIPP, they find that 401(k) contributions by low 
  19earning groups are more likely to represent new saving than those by high earning groups.  
Because high earning groups hold the majorities of 401(k) balances, they estimate that only 
between 0 and 30 percent of 401(k) balances represents net additions to private saving between 
1987 and 1991. 
Given the wide range of estimates of the impact of retirement saving programs on 
household saving, what studies’ results are closer to the “truth”?  In a review of several studies, 
Hubbard and Skinner (1996) argue that the saving effects of retirement programs are likely to 
lie somewhere between the extremes of “no new saving” and “all new saving”.  Their 
conservative estimate is that 26 cents per dollar of IRA contribution represent new saving. 
4.2  The Empirical Strategy to Control for Saver Heterogeneity in This Study 
To examine the issue of saver heterogeneity in this study, Table 5 presents some 
summary statistics of the respondents to the 2000 TIAA-CREF SPF by the ownership status of 
education saving instruments.  Clearly, households who own education saving have quite 
different economic and demographic characteristics than those who do not own.  Households 
who own education savings tend to be slightly more educated, earn higher incomes, more likely 
to own a home, to be married, and to have an IRA or Keogh.  For example, the median 1999 
household income for households who own education saving was $100,000, compared to 
$73,000 for households who do not own education saving.  The difference is statistically 
significant at the one percent level.  Not surprisingly, households who own education saving on 
average have more and younger children than those who do not own.  
Table 5 also shows that households with education saving have slightly more net worth 
than those without education saving.  But this does not necessarily mean that education saving 
instruments stimulate new saving.  It is possible that there may be systematic differences 
  20between households who own and do not own education saving.  Therefore, analyses that do 
not take into account these fundamental differences are likely to attribute higher levels of 
wealth of the participant group to education saving participation and thus lead to an upward 
bias in the estimates of the effectiveness of education saving instruments. 
Generally, panel data or multiple waves of cross-sectional data are better suited to 
assessing the impact of saving programs than a single wave of cross-sectional data in that they 
allow one to compare changes in household saving over time.  However, because only one 
wave of the survey data is available for this study, any longitudinal, “over time” comparisons 
are not feasible for this paper.
10  Furthermore, unlike 401(k) plans, almost anyone is eligible for 
saving with 529 plans and Coverdells. Therefore, there is no eligibility experiment here, either. 
However, whether households have an IRA or Supplemental Retirement 
Annuities/Group Supplemental Retirement Annuities (SRA/GSRA) may be used to identify 
savers.
11  SRAs or GSRAs are offered by TIAA-CREF and available through employers.  SRAs 
or GSRAs provide similar tax benefits as 401(k)s.  Contributions are voluntary and tax-
deductible.  The annual contribution limit for a SRA or GSRA account is $11,000 in 2002 and 
$12,000 in 2003.  Earnings in SRAs or GRSAs grow tax-free and the entire proceeds are 
subject to income taxes upon withdrawal. 
Because participation in an IRA or a SRA/GSRA is entirely voluntary, it may be 
considered a reasonable signal of taste for saving.  For example, Poterba, Venti and Wise 
                                                 
10 Although a previous wealth survey was conducted among the Research Panel members in 1996, less 
than 400 members responded to both the 1996 and the 2000 surveys, not enough to conduct a longitudinal 
comparison.  See Bodie and Crane (1997) for a paper that used data from the 1996 Survey to analyze household 
asset allocation decisions. 
11 For annuitants who had already annuitized part or all of their TIAA-CREF retirement assets, many of 
them no longer had existing contracts (including SRAs or GSRAs) with TIAA-CREF at the time of the survey.  
Therefore, the ownership status of SRA/GSRA for annuitants is determined by whether they ever owned a SRA or 
  21(1994, 1995) use whether households participated in IRA or 401(k) saving programs as a signal 
of taste for saving.  In addition, participation in an IRA or a SRA/GSRA is also a good signal 
for households’ familiarity with tax-favored saving instruments.  As Table 5 shows, 63.4 
percent of the households who owned education saving also reported owning an IRA, 
compared to only 54.1 percent for households who did not own education saving. 
To the extent that the ownership status of IRA or SRA/GSRA only distinguishes savers 
from non-savers to a certain degree, heterogeneity in individuals’ propensities to save may still 
exist within the owner or non-owner group.  Therefore, the propensity score approach is used to 
better control for unobserved saver heterogeneity.  The propensity score approach is a recently 
developed technique often used to estimate the average treatment effects of program 
participation.  The propensity score approach has successfully reduced the selection bias in 
many studies.  For example, Dehejia and Wahba (1999) use the propensity score approach to 
estimate the treatment effects in observational studies.  They find that the propensity score 
approach succeeds in replicating the treatment effects of a random experimental study 
presented in Lalonde (1986).  
In this paper, the propensity score approach is applied as follows.  In the first step, a 
probit model is used to estimate the propensity of household having an education savings 
account.  In the second step, households are sorted by their estimated propensities, from lowest 
to highest.  Households who do not own an education savings account and have an estimated 
propensity score higher than the maximum or lower than the minimum estimated propensity 
score for those who do own are discarded.  In the third step, households are stratified into 
different strata based on their propensities to have an education savings account estimated from 
                                                                                                                                                           
GSRA account before they annuitized their assets. 
  22the first step.  Strata with too few numbers of observations (less than 5) with education savings 
accounts are discarded.  The strata are chosen so that the covariates are “balanced” within each 
stratum, i.e., no statistical differences in means of covariates among households who have and 
who do not have education savings account.  Fourth, within-stratum robust regressions are run 
to estimate the impact of education saving on other household assets. 
The propensity score approach greatly reduces the saver heterogeneity within each 
stratum in that by design, within a stratum households who have and who do not have an 
education savings account have similar propensities to use an education savings account and 
similar covariates.  In other words, there is no systematic difference between those who have 
and who do not have an education savings account within a stratum.  Therefore, the propensity 
score approach should provide reliable estimates. 
4.3  Empirical Model and Specifications 
The empirical model to be estimated is as follows: 
W =  " + $* X + (* Edsave_balance + g     EQ (1)  
Where W is a wealth measure and Edsave_balance is the aggregate balance of a household’s 
education saving.  X is a vector of household demographic variables including respondent’s 
age, gender, education, marital status, household income, number of children, bequest motive, 
whether the respondent is an annuitant, and whether the household is covered by a defined 
benefit pension.  For married respondents, the household income is the sum of the respondent 
and the spouse’s income.  For other respondents, household income is set equal to the 
respondent’s income.  The income measure includes labor income, pension and social security 
income, rental income, interests, dividends, and capital gains. 
In the regression analysis, two wealth measures are employed as the dependent variable.  
  23The first measure is net non-education financial assets, which is the total of non-education 
retirement and non-retirement assets including stock mutual funds, bond mutual funds, money 
market mutual funds, individual stocks, bonds, savings account, checking account, and 
certificate of deposit less personal loans, educational loans, and credit card balances.  The 
second wealth measure is non-education net worth, which is the sum of net non-education 
financial assets and real estate equity.  Real estate equity is defined as the difference between 
the total value of the household’s primary home and other properties the household owns and 
the mortgage debt against these real estate properties.   
5 Results 
5.1  Using IRA Ownership to Identify Savers 
This section presents results from estimating the model described in Section 4.3.  The 
model is estimated separately for households who own and do not own an IRA.  Table 6 
presents the summary statistics for the full regression sample and by IRA ownership.  Table 6 
indicates a higher proportion of IRA owners have an education savings accounts than non-
owners.  Perhaps this is related to the fact that IRA owners on average have more children in 
the household. 
Because wealth distribution is skewed, mean regressions are often driven by outliers.  
Therefore, median regressions are used instead. Heteroskedasticity in the error term is corrected 
by estimating the standard errors using bootstrap estimation with 200 iterations. 
Table 7 presents results from using net non-education financial assets as the dependent 
variable.  The coefficient estimates of most explanatory variables have the expected signs.  Not 
surprisingly, net non-education financial assets increase with household income and age for 
  24both IRA owner and non-owner groups.  For both groups, having an SRA/GRSA account has a 
positive and significant impact on net non-education financial assets.  Bequest motive 
(measured on a 0-10 scale) seems to be positively associated with net non-education financial 
assets for both groups and the estimate is somewhat significant for IRA owners.   
For both groups, education saving is positively associated with net non-education 
financial assets and the estimate is statistically significant for IRA owners.  This suggests that 
for IRA owners, saving with education saving instruments seems to have a positive impact on 
other household financial assets. 
Not surprisingly, having a defined benefit retirement plan has a negative and 
statistically significant impact on net non-education financial asset for both groups.  This 
indicates that households who are covered by a defined benefit plan may save less in other 
forms.   
Because there is a penalty on non-qualified withdrawals from tax-favored education 
saving instruments, education saving may be considered illiquid.  Furthermore, education 
saving may be considered long-term investment because many households are saving for their 
young children’s future college expenses, which very often will occur many years later.  To the 
extent that both housing and education saving may be considered illiquid and long-term 
investment, households may increase education saving by taking out more home mortgage 
debt.  Therefore, regressions that use wealth measures that do not include home equity may 
overestimate the impact of saving incentives.  
To address this issue, the model is estimated using non-education net worth (the sum of 
net non-education financial assets and real estate equity) as the dependent variable.  Results are 
presented in Table 8.  Most parameter estimates are similar to those presented in Table 7.  The 
  25estimates of the education saving variable for both groups are still positive, yet statistically 
insignificant.  This indicates that after real estate equity is taken into account, education saving 
has a negligible impact on households’ non-education net worth. 
5.2  Using the Ownership Status of SRA/GSRA to Identify Savers 
This section presents results from estimating the model separately for SRA/GSRA 
owners and non-owners. Again, two wealth measures are used as the dependent variable.  Table 
9 presents the summary statistics for the full regression sample and by SRA/GSRA ownership.  
Surprisingly, the proportions of SRA/GSRA owners and non-owners who have an education 
savings account are almost identical.  Moreover, the mean value of total education saving is 
higher for SRA non-owners than for owners ($949 vs. $471).  This indicates that the saver and 
non-saver groups defined by the ownership status of SRA/GSRAs are somewhat different from 
those defined by the ownership status of IRAs. 
Table 10 presents results from using net non-education financial assets as the dependent 
variable.  The coefficient estimates of many explanatory variables are similar to those presented 
in Table 7.  For both SRA/GSRA owner and non-owner groups, net non-education financial 
assets increase with income and age.  For both groups, having an IRA is positively associated 
with net non-education financial assets.  Having a defined benefit pension plan is negatively 
associated with net non-education financial assets and the estimate is statistically significant for 
SRA non-owners. 
Total education saving is positively associated with net non-education financial assets 
and the estimate is statistically significant for SRA non-owners and somewhat significant for 
SRA owners.  This suggests that saving with education saving instruments seem to be 
positively associated with other household financial assets for both groups. 
  26Table 11 presents results from using non-education net worth as the dependent variable.  
Table 11 suggests that when real estate equity is taken into account, total education saving is 
positively associated with non-education net worth and the estimates are statistically significant 
for both SRA owner and non-owner groups.  The estimates of most other explanatory variables 
are similar to those reported in Table 10. 
5.3  Using the Propensity Score Method to Control for Saver Heterogeneity 
  The results from using the ownership status of IRA or SRA/GSRA suggest that total 
education saving seems to be positively associated with other household assets and the 
estimates are statistically significant in many cases.  Specifically, total education saving has a 
positive and statistically significant impact on net non-education financial assets for IRA 
owners.  However, when real estate equity is taken into account, the estimate becomes 
statistically insignificant.  Total education saving has a positive impact on net non-education 
financial assets and non-education net worth for both SRA/GSRA owners and non-owners and 
most of the estimates are significant.   
As mentioned earlier, the saver and non-saver groups defined by the IRA ownership are 
somewhat different from those defined by the SRA/GSRA ownership.  This suggests that the 
ownership status of IRA or SRA/GSRA controls for saver heterogeneity only to a certain 
degree and potential unobserved heterogeneity in individuals’ propensities to save might still 
exist within the owner or non-owner group.   
One way to better control for unobserved saver heterogeneity is to use the propensity 
score approach.  This section presents the results from using the propensity score approach to 
control for saver heterogeneity.  In order to estimate the impact of education saving on 
household net worth, a reasonable number of households with education saving is needed.  
  27Therefore, strata with less than 5 observations that have an education savings account are 
discarded.  The discarded strata are those in the bottom 40 percentile of the estimated 
propensity score distribution. 
Table 12 presents results from robust regressions within each of the remaining 
propensity score strata.  Table 12 indicates total education saving has a positive and significant 
impact on other household net worth for the top two propensity score strata (Strata 4 and 5).  
Moreover, the estimates are consistent with those obtained from using IRA or SRA/GSRA 
ownership to identify savers.  Because Stratum 5 has the most reasonable balance of 
households who own and those who do not own education savings accounts, estimates for 
Stratum 5 should be considered the most reliable estimates.  For propensity score strata 1-3, 
total education saving does not seem to have a significant impact on other household net worth.   
  As a sensitivity analysis, the propensity score approach is applied to only households 
with children (365 cases, slightly less than one third of the full regression sample).  Again, 
households are sorted into strata based on their estimated propensity to use an education 
savings account.  The lowest stratum is discarded due to the low number of households with an 
education savings account (three cases). 
  Table 13 presents the results using the subsample of households with children.  Table 
13 reiterates the findings in Table 12.  That is, total education saving has a positive and 
significant impact on other household net worth for the high propensity score strata (Strata 2 
and 3).  Moreover, the estimates are very similar to those in Table 12.  This further confirms 
that the propensity score approach provides reliable and robust estimates.  The estimates are 
especially robust for high-propensity-strata.  
 
  286 Concluding  Remarks 
  Whether saving incentives increase total private and public saving has been the subject 
of an ongoing debate.  In the last two decades, a substantial amount of research has been 
devoted to address this issue with a focus on the saving effects of retirement saving incentives 
on total household saving. 
  In recent years, the federal government has introduced several education saving 
instruments in support of saving for education expenses.  As in the case of retirement saving 
incentives, an important public policy issue is whether these education saving instruments 
stimulate new saving.  Because these education saving instruments are relatively new, data are 
not readily available.  The lack of data makes it difficult to empirically estimate the saving 
effects of these education saving instruments.  
Using wealth data from a survey of TIAA-CREF participants, this paper attempts to 
estimate the impact of education saving instruments on household non-education assets.  In the 
analysis, two strategies are used to control for saver heterogeneity.  The first strategy uses the 
ownership status of IRA or SRA/GSRA as a signal of household’s taste for saving.  The second 
strategy uses the propensity score method to control for saver heterogeneity.   
Using IRA or SRA/GSRA ownership to identify savers from non-savers, median 
regression results suggest that education saving does not offset other household assets.  In 
many cases, education saving seems to be positively associated with other household assets and 
the estimates are significant.  Results from the propensity score method confirm these findings.  
Specifically, education saving is positively associated with other household assets for 
households with higher propensities to use education savings accounts. 
It is not surprising that this study finds no evidence of household shifting assets from 
  29other accounts to tax-favored education savings accounts.  This is the case because if 
withdrawals are not used for college expenses, a ten-percent penalty as well as regular income 
tax is imposed on earnings.  If an individual withdraws money from an education savings 
account for non-education purposes, the after-tax, after-penalty asset accumulation could be 
easily trumped by that from a tax-efficient mutual fund, assuming the same rates of return for 
the mutual fund and the education savings account.  Therefore, if an individual anticipates that 
there is a high probability that withdrawals will not be used for education purposes, he/she 
would be unlikely to use an education savings account. 
Also of considerable interest are the potential institutional responses to tax-favored 
education saving programs.  Some researchers argue that these saving programs may have 
long-term impact on admission policies.  For example, Olivas (2000) argue that some higher 
education institutions may predicate admissions on ability to pay.  These programs may also 
present an opportunity for some institutions to raise tuition even more.   
As 529 plans and Coverdells continue to grow, new data may become available.  With 
new and hopefully better data, alternative and possibly more robust methods may be used to 
control for saver heterogeneity.  Such methods may include using panel data to compare 
changes in household assets for those who own and those who do not own education savings 
account.  State variation in 529 plans may be used to examine the impact of plan features on 
individuals’ saving behaviors.  Future research should also examine the impact of education 
saving instruments on national saving.  
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Table 1.  Key Features of the 529 Plan and Coverdell Education Savings Account 
  (1) 
529 Plan 
(2) 
Coverdell Education Savings 
Account 
Tax Benefits  Earnings federal and state income 
tax deferred and federal income tax 
free, if withdrawals are used for 
qualified higher education expenses.  
Most states exempt earnings of 
qualified withdrawals from state tax.  
Some states also allow contributions 
to be deducted from state income tax  
(usually subject to an annual limit). 
Earnings federal and state 
income tax free, if used for 
qualified elementary, 
secondary and higher 
education expenses. 
Is the Value of the 
Account Excluded 
from the Owner’s 
Taxable Estate? 
Yes. Yes. 
How Much Can Be 
Invested ? 
Varies by state. Some states allow 
new contributions until the account 
balance reaches $305,000. 
Up to $2,000 per year. 
Qualified Education 
Expenses  
Tuition, fees, books, supplies, room 
and board, and equipment at an 
eligible post-secondary education 
institution. 
Same as (1) for higher 
education expenses. 
Elementary and secondary 




Savings plans: parents’ assets if the 
account is under a parent’s name; 




Investment Decision?  
State sponsor with input from 
program manager. 
Owner. 
Income Restriction   No.  Yes. 
Impact on Hope and 
Lifetime Tax Credits 
Education expenses used to support 
tax-free distributions from a 529 
plan may not be used to claim a 
Hope or Lifetime Learning credit. 
Education expenses used to 
support tax-free distributions 
from a Coverdell may not be 
used to claim a Hope or 
Lifetime Learning credit. 
Flexibility Earnings  on  non-qualified 
withdrawals taxed at the 
distributee’s income tax rate plus an 
additional 10% tax.  
Earnings on non-qualified 
withdrawals taxed at the 
distributee’s income tax rate 
plus an additional 10% tax. 
  Table 2.  Examples of Saving for a College Education 
  Type of College 
 Public  two-year  Public  four-year Private  four-year
Current annual cost: 
   
 
2001-2002 average total charges 








Average cost of a four-year 
education (or two-year for public 
two-year colleges) for a student 
enrolling in 2019 
$8,575 $93,438 $244,571
Investment period (years)  18 18 18
Monthly saving needed to meet the 
goal
3  $22 $240  $630 
 
 
Saving instruments may be used 
 
 




529 plan or 
combination of 




529 plan or 
combination of 
529 plan and 
Coverdell 
Note:    
1)  Tuition and fees only for public two-year colleges.  Source: Trends in College Pricing 
2001, the College Board. 
2)  Assuming the average college costs increase by 5% per year into the future. 
3)  Assuming a 6% annual nominal rate of return for saving.
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Table 3.  Summary Statistics of Households from the 1998 SCF and 2000 TIAA-CREF SPF
   Median  25th percentile 75th percentile  Mean 
1998 SCF 
Financial characteristics   
   Household Income  $33,000 $17,000 $60,000  $52,296
   Total financial assets  $17,320 $1,500 $85,000  $134,234
   Total personal debt  $1,530 $0 $11,000  $9,920
   Total real estate assets  $70,000 $0 $140,000  $109,063
   Total mortgage debt  $0 $0 $55,000  $37,621
   Total net worth  $71,700 $9,920 $208,850  $282,592
   Percent own primary residence  -- -- --  66.3%
Demographics      
   Respondent's age  46.0 35.0 61.0  48.7
   Respondent's education level         
      Less than high school  -- -- --  16.5%
      High school or GED  -- -- --  31.9%
      Some college  -- -- --  18.5%
      College and above  -- -- --  33.2%
2000 TIAA-CREF SPF
1 
Financial characteristics       
   Household Income  $75,000 $48,000 $111,000  $94,550
   Total financial assets  $336,750 $119,117 $859,000  $665,330
   Total personal debt  $0 $0 $5,000  $9,221
   Total real estate assets  $160,000 $95,000 $300,000  $257,469
   Total mortgage debt  $15,000 $0 $89,000  $62,943
   Total net worth  $467,728 $187,375 $1,108,500  $837,333
   Percent own primary residence  -- -- --  85.7%
Demographics       
   Respondent's age  59.0 48.0 69.0  57.9
   Respondent's education level         
      High school or less  -- -- --  3.2%
      Some college  -- -- --  9.1%
      College graduate  -- -- --  18.9%
      Master or first professional  -- -- --  35.2%
      Ph.D.  -- -- --  33.4%
Source: Author’s calculations based on the 1998 SCF and the 2000 TIAA-CREF SPF. 
Note:  1) For 2000 TIAA-CREF SPF, financial assets and demographic information was as 
of   December 31, 1999. 
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Type of Asset  (Column 1) (Column 2) (Column 3)  (Column 4) 
Respondent's Retirement Assets   
(1) 
TIAA-CREF Employer-Sponsored 
Retirement Accounts  7.2 77.8 20.6  23.2
(2) 
Non-TIAA-CREF Employer-
sponsored Retirement Accounts  7.7 31.2 17.3  13.1
(3)  IRA or KEOGH Account  7.7 44.3 10.9  12.5
(4)  Other Tax-Deferred Annuities  10.2 17.8 19.8  13.7
Other Financial Assets   
(5)  Stock mutual funds  5.8 46.8 10.6  10.7
(6) Publicly  traded  stock  4.1 48.2 11.5  9.6
(7)  Tax-free bond mutual funds  5.8 16.0 17.9  8.7
(8)  Other bond mutual funds  6.3 11.7 17.7  8.4
(9)  U.S. government savings bonds  5.4 24.3 11.6  8.3
(10) Corporate bonds or foreign bonds  6.4 5.7 20.3  7.6
(11) Savings accounts  2.0 71.0 6.2  6.4
(12) Checking accounts  2.1 94.9 6.3  8.1
(13) Certificates and deposit  3.3 29.9 8.9  5.9
(14) Money market mutual funds  5.2 41.9 11.2  9.9
Education Saving     
(15) Education IRA  16.3 3.9 11.9  16.8
(16) 529 Savings plan  16.0 2.0 7.0  16.2
(17) 529 Prepaid contract  16.0 0.5 15.4  16.0
Source: Author's calculations based on the 2000 TIAA-CREF SPF data.   
             Total number of respondents: 2,793.    
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Table 5.  Summary Statistics of Respondents to the 2000 TIAA-CREF SPF 
by Ownership of Education Saving 
  
Own at least one of the 
three types of education 
savings accounts 
(171 cases) 
Do not own any 
education savings 
accounts  
(2,347 cases)    
Median      
Respondent's age (years)  52.0 59.0 ** 
Household 1999 income  $100,000 $73,000 *** 
Household net non-education 
financial assets  $346,493 $332,500  
Household non-education net 
worth $473,000 $465,000   
Number of children the 
household is financially 
responsible for  1 0 *** 
Age of oldest child in the 
household 8.0 13.0  *** 
Mean      
Respondent's age (years)  55.3 57.6 ** 
Household 1999 income  $119,390 $93,995 ** 
Household net non-education 
financial assets  $680,093 $664,998  
Household non-education net 
worth $892,684 $832,778   
Number of children the 
household is financially 
responsible for  1.00 0.45 *** 
Age of oldest child in the 
household 7.6 12.5  *** 
Percent with a Ph.D. degree  38.2% 34.4%  
Percent own home     92.9% 85.2% *** 
Percent with IRA or Keogh  63.4% 54.1% ** 
Percent with supplemental 
pension 46.0% 43.4%   
Percent married  82.5% 65.0% *** 
Note:  ** indicates the medians (means) of the two groups are statistically different at the 
5% level. 
     *** indicates the medians (means) of the two groups are statistically different at the 
1% level. 
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Table 6.  Summary Statistics of Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
      By IRA Ownership   Full  Regression 
      Own  Do Not Own    Sample 




Deviation     Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Non-education Net worth  
(in $000’s)  1044.482 1063.457 543.162 839.841   803.928 994.371
Net non-education financial 
assets (in $000’s)  850.548 939.772 406.805 679.972   637.621 854.347
Education saving (in $000’s)  1.230 9.822 0.231 1.660   0.751 7.191
Respondent's age
1    
   45-54  0.243 0.429 0.242 0.429   0.243 0.429
   55-64  0.237 0.426 0.181 0.386   0.210 0.408
   65 and older  0.274 0.446 0.252 0.435   0.263 0.441
Respondent is male  0.576 0.495 0.557 0.497   0.567 0.496
Household income  
(in $000’s)  108.802 112.936 77.532 78.905   93.798 99.291
Respondent's education
2    
  Master's degree  0.388 0.488 0.329 0.470   0.360 0.480
  Doctorate degree  0.340 0.474 0.316 0.465   0.329 0.470
Respondent is an annuitant  0.229 0.421 0.249 0.433   0.239 0.426
Other household variables    
  Has an SRA/GSRA  0.447 0.498 0.379 0.486   0.414 0.493
  Covered by a DB plan  0.348 0.476 0.298 0.458   0.324 0.468
  Number of children  0.448 0.852 0.623 1.020   0.532 0.940
  Bequest motive  4.711 3.269 4.890 3.330   4.797 3.298
Respondent's marital status
3    
  Single  0.157 0.364 0.201 0.401   0.178 0.383
  Divorced  0.099 0.299 0.125 0.331   0.111 0.315
  Widowed  0.043 0.202 0.051 0.220   0.047 0.211
Percent owning a Coverdell, 
a 529 savings, or a 529 
prepaid account  0.071 0.258 0.046 0.210   0.059 0.236
Number of Observations  658  607    1265 
Note: 
1)  The reference group consists of those respondents who are younger than 45. 
2)  The reference group consists of those respondents with a college degree or less. 
3)  The reference group consists of those respondents who are married. 
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Table 7.  Median Regression Estimates by IRA Ownership Status 
Dependent Variable:  Net Non-education Financial Assets 
 IRA  Ownership 
  Own    Do Not Own 
Explanatory Variable  Coefficient
Standard 
Error Pr > |t|  Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Pr > |t|
Total education saving  5.553 2.721 0.042 10.859  10.808 0.315
Respondent's age   
   45-54  198.766 58.879 0.001 103.189  26.457 0.000
   55-64  422.272 67.675 0.000 311.243  61.304 0.000
   65 and older  548.297 90.015 0.000 475.196  66.590 0.000
Respondent is male  129.881 43.938 0.003 18.817  20.758 0.365
Household income  3.471 0.912 0.000 3.349  0.989 0.001
Respondent's education
2   
  Master's degree  74.682 50.279 0.138 -6.428  20.332 0.752
  Doctorate degree  155.424 70.704 0.028 34.968  31.145 0.262
Respondent is an annuitant  -82.818 73.102 0.258 -141.594  60.170 0.019
Other household variables   
  Has an SRA/GSRA  135.517 41.603 0.001 57.015  24.088 0.018
  Covered by a DB plan  -98.677 41.094 0.017 -64.311  23.796 0.007
  Number of children  3.391 33.515 0.919 7.986  11.315 0.481
  Bequest motive  11.582 7.236 0.110 3.166  2.448 0.196
Respondent's marital status
3   
  Single  53.758 64.898 0.408 57.465  33.338 0.085
  Divorced  -125.311 63.726 0.050 -2.679  42.346 0.950
  Widowed  87.716 107.929 0.417 -57.123  58.336 0.328
Constant -258.595 73.870 0.000 -189.379  61.329 0.002
Pseudo R-squared    0.248    0.255 
Number of Observations    658.000    607.000 
Note:  Standard errors are bootstrapped with 200 iterations. 
  39 
Table 8.  Median Regression Estimates by IRA Ownership Status 
Dependent Variable:  Non-education Net Worth 
 IRA  Ownership 
     Own          Do Not Own 
Explanatory Variable  Coefficient
Standard 
Error Pr > |t|   Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Pr > |t|
Total education saving  6.480 5.269 0.219  10.859  11.422 0.342
Respondent's age     
   45-54  316.490 66.325 0.000  103.189  27.820 0.000
   55-64  566.248 83.876 0.000  311.243  57.901 0.000
   65 and older  731.023 90.442 0.000  475.196  69.941 0.000
Respondent is male  141.981 52.787 0.007  18.817  17.625 0.286
Household income  4.119 1.127 0.000  3.349  0.860 0.000
Respondent's education
2    
  Master's degree  111.187 56.957 0.051  -6.428  19.727 0.745
  Doctorate degree  162.612 78.517 0.039  34.968  28.265 0.217
Respondent is an annuitant  -19.477 83.469 0.816  -141.594  59.597 0.018
Other household variables     
  Has an SRA/GSRA  178.298 54.753 0.001  57.015  24.482 0.020
  Covered by a DB plan  -116.012 50.519 0.022  -64.311  24.223 0.008
  Number of children  4.087 35.706 0.909  7.986  10.296 0.438
  Bequest motive  18.604 8.809 0.035  3.166  2.588 0.222
Respondent's marital status
3    
  Single  30.548 71.989 0.671  57.465  34.433 0.096
  Divorced  -149.417 83.689 0.075  -2.679  41.091 0.948
  Widowed  34.226 140.933 0.808  -57.123  58.533 0.330
Constant -331.607 103.815 0.001  -189.379  54.773 0.001
Pseudo  R-squared   0.270     0.255 
Number  of  Observations   658.000     607.000 
Note:  Standard errors are bootstrapped with 200 iterations. 
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Table 9.  Summary Statistics of Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
      By SRA/GSRA Ownership   Full  Regression 
      Own  Do Not Own    Sample 




Deviation     Mean
Standard 
Deviation
Non-education Net worth (in 
$000’s) 924.168 1092.158 718.900 910.182    803.928 994.371
Net non-education financial 
assets (in $000’s)  743.893 939.874 562.471 780.249   637.621 854.347
Education saving (in $000’s)  0.471 3.623 0.949 8.885   0.751 7.191
Respondent's age
1    
   45-54  0.250 0.433 0.238 0.426   0.243 0.429
   55-64  0.198 0.399 0.219 0.414   0.210 0.408
   65 and older  0.225 0.418 0.290 0.454   0.263 0.441
Respondent is male  0.544 0.499 0.583 0.493   0.567 0.496
Household income (in 
$000’s) 100.456 99.463 89.089 98.966    93.798 99.291
Respondent's education
2    
  Master's degree  0.355 0.479 0.363 0.481   0.360 0.480
  Doctorate degree  0.336 0.473 0.324 0.468   0.329 0.470
Respondent is an annuitant  0.158 0.365 0.296 0.457   0.239 0.426
Other household variables    
  Has an IRA  0.561 0.497 0.491 0.500   0.520 0.500
  Covered by a DB plan  0.323 0.468 0.325 0.469   0.324 0.468
  Number of children  0.529 0.938 0.534 0.942   0.532 0.940
  Bequest motive  4.908 3.281 4.748 3.310   4.797 3.298
Respondent's marital status
3    
  Single  0.179 0.384 0.177 0.382   0.178 0.383
  Divorced  0.105 0.307 0.116 0.321   0.111 0.315
  Widowed  0.038 4.821 0.053 0.223   0.047 0.211
Percent owning a Coverdell, 
a 529 savings, or a 529 
prepaid account  0.0592 0.2361 0.0594 0.2365   0.0593 0.2363
Number of Observations  524  741    1265 
Note: 
1)  The reference group consists of those respondents who are younger than 45. 
2)  The reference group consists of those respondents with a college degree or less. 
3)  The reference group consists of those respondents who are married. 
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Table 10.  Median Regression Estimates by SRA/GSRA Ownership Status 
Dependent Variable:  Net non-education Financial assets 
 SRA/GSRA  Ownership 
  Own  Do Not Own 
Explanatory Variable  Coefficient
Standard 
Error Pr > |t| Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Pr > |t|
Total education saving  19.461 12.759 0.128 5.704  2.586 0.028
Respondent's age   
   45-54  174.266 50.506 0.001 119.547  28.422 0.000
   55-64  526.887 91.981 0.000 298.150  51.675 0.000
   65 and older  808.783 154.705 0.000 449.203  60.519 0.000
Respondent is male  97.545 38.312 0.011 23.441  18.987 0.217
Household income  4.049 1.382 0.004 2.860  0.772 0.000
Respondent's education
2   
  Master's degree  13.354 40.578 0.742 39.874  25.280 0.115
  Doctorate degree  99.337 73.087 0.175 82.344  32.122 0.011
Respondent is an annuitant  -166.672 144.350 0.249 -102.114  50.565 0.044
Other household variables   
  Has an IRA  141.057 39.432 0.000 133.961  25.738 0.000
  Covered by a DB plan  -31.770 48.722 0.515 -85.668  24.119 0.000
  Number of children  -6.450 22.351 0.773 0.899  13.962 0.949
  Bequest motive  5.619 6.272 0.371 7.705  2.880 0.008
Respondent's marital status
3   
  Single  80.574 60.783 0.186 36.832  39.108 0.347
  Divorced  -26.046 88.076 0.768 -56.097  35.198 0.111
  Widowed  -51.430 157.248 0.744 -38.469  57.526 0.504
Constant -297.439 108.130 0.006 -185.444  48.093 0.000
Pseudo R-squared  0.294    0.276 
Number of Observations  524.000    741.000 
Note:  Standard errors are bootstrapped with 200 iterations. 
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Table 11.  Median Regression Estimates by SRA/GSRA Ownership Status 
Dependent Variable:  Non-education Net Worth 
 SRA/GSRA  Ownership 
  Own    Do Not Own 
Explanatory Variable  Coefficient
Standard 
Error Pr > |t|   Coefficient 
Standard
Error Pr > |t|
Total education saving  25.411 15.320 0.098  6.190  2.738 0.024
Respondent's age     
   45-54  281.438 60.139 0.000  153.994  39.615 0.000
   55-64  630.262 89.600 0.000  397.628  56.849 0.000
   65 and older  942.358 149.970 0.000  574.394  63.820 0.000
Respondent is male  98.371 43.115 0.023  39.231  29.331 0.181
Household income  4.802 1.489 0.001  4.207  1.135 0.000
Respondent's education
2    
  Master's degree  19.526 49.788 0.695  68.008  31.335 0.030
  Doctorate degree  142.515 78.821 0.071  98.484  43.687 0.024
Respondent is an annuitant  -78.273 128.859 0.544  -96.857  57.587 0.093
Other household variables     
  Has an IRA  180.751 51.217 0.000  172.117  34.098 0.000
  Covered by a DB plan  -27.206 58.012 0.639  -116.607  30.960 0.000
  Number of children  3.490 25.240 0.890  -7.758  18.330 0.672
  Bequest motive  12.680 7.139 0.076  7.625  3.928 0.053
Respondent's marital status
3    
  Single  118.639 72.100 0.100  6.973  51.340 0.892
  Divorced  -61.597 88.419 0.486  -64.798  47.706 0.175
  Widowed  -84.079 191.382 0.661  -115.048  68.197 0.092
Constant -387.224 122.123 0.002  -227.520  68.632 0.001
Pseudo R-squared 




Number of Observations    524        741
Note:  Standard errors are bootstrapped with 200 iterations. 
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Table 12.  Robust Regression Estimates Within Propensity Score Stratum 
Dependent Variable:  Non-education Net Worth 
Explanatory Variable  Stratum 1 Stratum 2 Stratum 3 Stratum 4  Stratum 5
Total education saving  -0.800 33.378 -1.630 43.720  6.987
 (8.886) (22.766) (3.227) (5.792)  (1.612)
Respondent's age   
   45-54  137.424 284.086 131.981 514.630  117.176
 (116.349) (147.428) (128.090) (120.373)  (61.603)
   55-64  334.479 505.351 420.808 1000.985  574.172
 (112.218) (146.733) (153.895) (175.217)  (139.212)
   65 and older  568.080 1122.364 889.738 1602.332  315.813
 (119.067) (145.528) (163.574) (189.815)  (297.402)
Respondent is male  183.186 -94.846 214.522 166.300  97.101
 (65.856) (90.872) (111.123) (84.128)  (59.423)
Household income  7.492 2.265 6.192 1.171  4.156
 (0.466) (0.245) (0.870) (0.282)  (0.362)
Respondent's education
2   
  Master's degree  -52.866 -27.975 -76.745 133.015  9.418
 (75.267) (100.989) (122.333) (90.734)  (71.019)
  Doctorate degree  90.631 145.729 -233.562 24.053  26.835
 (77.299) (104.068) (124.768) (105.587)  (71.649)
Respondent is an annuitant  10.668 -359.587 -149.138 -812.914  1172.186
 (88.019) (118.841) (144.527) (184.435)  (369.222)
Other household variables   
  Has an IRA  204.630 237.669 496.727 191.161  116.935
 (86.250) (112.528) (165.217) (121.449)  (73.718)
  Has an SRA/GSRA  171.909 184.538 168.087 77.488  117.145
 (62.528) (76.265) (92.100) (76.583)  (54.699)
  Covered by a DB plan  -132.100 22.728 -110.346 -87.377  -90.475
 (64.673) (79.958) (94.594) (74.608)  (54.713)
  Number of children  100.496 68.385 105.115 60.098  15.151
 (101.888) (85.665) (94.173) (56.592)  (40.904)
  Bequest motive  28.097 18.675 12.485 22.126  -4.947
 (19.915) (23.369) (19.704) (18.070)  (10.231)
Respondent's marital status
3   
  44  Single  -35.388 -89.058 dropped 157.695  dropped
 (144.566) (214.701) (353.224) 
  Divorced  -85.597 -49.300 -241.135 dropped  315.586
 (154.525) (235.296) (376.450)   (304.061)
  Widowed  48.988 133.810 dropped dropped  dropped
 (185.194) (536.131)  
Constant -664.085 -264.749 -625.249 -365.156  -245.880
 (151.256) (206.924) (214.536) (189.813)  (149.174)
F-statistics 30.15 15.64 14.99 31.03  21.30
Number of Observations  253 195 104 96  125
Number of Observations with 
an education savings account  5 10 15 12  25
 
Note:  The first stage probit model includes the following covariates: a dummy variable for 
household owning an IRA, age, age squared, the number of kids in the household, bequest 
motive, a dummy variable indicating the respondent is married, and an interaction term of the 
number of kids and bequest motive.  Results from the probit model are not sensitive to the 
addition of other covariates. 
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Table 13.  Robust Regression Estimates Within Propensity Score Stratum 
Including Only Households with Children in the Analysis 
Dependent Variable:  Non-education Net Worth 
Explanatory Variable  Stratum 1 Stratum 2   Stratum 3
Total education saving  19.105  63.864  6.666
 (29.630)  (13.440)  (1.469)
Respondent's age     
   45-54  120.958  182.047  144.011
 (133.670)  (133.913)  (72.945)
   55-64  552.632  278.244  dropped
 (253.275)  (189.202)  
   65 and older  1211.519  dropped  dropped
 (357.479)   
Respondent is male  -83.223  135.956  51.762
 (93.673)  (74.563)  (68.098)
Household income  3.372  1.191  4.330
 (0.920)  (0.220)  (0.357)
Respondent's education
2     
  Master's degree  44.676  185.003  -0.595
 (114.485)  (87.852)  (80.848)
  Doctorate degree  39.580  87.583  18.004
 (112.901)  (95.765)  (77.512)
Respondent is an annuitant  dropped  1412.520  dropped
    (369.338)  
Other household variables     
  Has an IRA  355.351  406.870  117.019
 (205.025)  (141.415)  (88.270)
  Has an SRA/GSRA  194.686  -22.755  99.548
 (99.469)  (65.994)  (58.624)
  Covered by a DB plan  -54.315  -68.183  -107.001
 (103.928)  (72.293)  (56.576)
  Number of children  -46.238  -59.692  57.746
 (65.245)  (44.004)  (40.719)
  Bequest motive  12.757  -8.072  1.060
 (18.554)  (15.219)  (10.168)
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Respondent's marital status
3     
  Single  -419.492  289.475  dropped
 (298.516)  (360.191)  
  Divorced  -75.292  dropped  dropped
 (261.743)   
  Widowed  dropped  dropped  dropped
     
Constant -41.174  114.553  -346.402
 (274.015)  (153.946)  (120.001)
F-statistics 9.25 19.42   23.90
Number of Observations  60 118   91
Number of Observations with 
an education savings account  9 10   30
Note:  The first stage probit model includes the following covariates: a dummy variable for 
household owning an IRA, age, age squared, household income, respondent’s education, the 
number of kids in the household, bequest motive, a dummy variable indicating the respondent 
is married, and an interaction term of the number of kids and bequest motive.  Results from 
the probit model are not sensitive to the addition of other covariates. 